Introduction
So much has been written about Bosnia-Herzegovina that almost every aspect of its very recent past has been discussed from various perspectives and in different disciplinary approaches. At the moment, it is important to note that the political system of Bosnia-Herzegovina is highly complex institutionally. This is one of the results of the political negotiations that led to the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA, 1995) , which endorsed consociational mechanisms of power-sharing that trade individual human rights and liberties for nominal equality among (ethnic) groups.
1 The state is underperforming economically, there is a perpetual political crisis and progress toward membership in the European Union (EU) -so often understood as the final destination of the "transitional journey" -is almost non-existent. The key findings of the EU 2011 Progress Report on Bosnia-Herzegovina emphasize, although in a diplomatic manner, that the overall pace of reforms has been very limited.
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The majority of efforts by international and domestic actors to mitigate the consequences of the war at the level of social relations have been insufficient, largely because many of the roots of the conflict still prevail, in a variety of new and old forms. Consequently, a predominant ethnicization of all aspects of social and political life is one of the crucial issues that have not yet been adequately addressed.
More than 16 years since the war ended, Bosnian-Herzegovinan society is still struggling to find a means of reconstruction that would result in a solid base and prospect for a better life. As time goes by it becomes ever clearer that the political and institutional design of Dayton-tailored Bosnia-Herzegovina do not contribute to the vital processes society needs, such as the mending of broken social relationships and the rebuilding of interethnic confidence. As McMahon some time ago observed: these solutions cannot create the country envisioned by the peace agreement because the existing institutional framework prevents them from doing so. Nation-building efforts in Bosnia, as currently conceived, cannot reintegrate the country or transform its society because such strategies are, in fact, at odds with the country's governing structure. (2004) (2005) 583) The very Peace Agreement was also "a masterful diplomatic creation precisely because of its imprecision, allowing all sides, including the international community, to claim some kind of victory" (Pajić, 2001, 49) . At its core, it relies on fundamental contradictions. Declaring a unified state of Bosnia-Herzegovina while recognizing two antagonistic entities, proclaiming democracy while entrenching ethnically based institutional structures and reaffirming individual rights while legitimizing ethnic majoritarianism, from the outset raised serious concerns as to which political concept in Bosnia-Herzegovina would prevail.
The condition at the level of the state is such that the concept of power-sharing does not function within the restrictions of ( proportional ) ethnic representation -as it has not for many years. Instead of a positive consensus on cooperation in order to rebuild institutions, there is a negative consensus, which is manifested through the systemic blockage on the implementation of decisions necessary for restoration, social reconstruction, and political reconciliation. The situation for the last 16 years or so has been better defined as "absence of war" than by "peace" itself. Bosnia-Herzegovina as constructed by DPA 3 has revealed itself to be an ineffective creation based on the constant re-generation of crisis that encourages the accumulation of political power by ethnonationalist elites.
All in all, its own past and present is one of the most difficult dilemmas society in Bosnia-Herzegovina has faced. So the questions arise: is the issue of reconciliation something that is "naturally" of the utmost relevance to the society's future? And what reconciliation means, what kind of reconciliation the Bosnian-Herzegovinan population, its leadership and state institution envisage?
In this chapter, I argue that reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to be approached as political reconciliation of the society that struggles with issues of justice in the aftermath of war crimes. Secondly, I explore the ambiguous role of two crucial sets of actors who do (or do
